Session 6:What Kind of Knowledge Do the Humanities Produce?

Prof. Michel Chaouli
Director, Institute of German Studies, 

Adjct. Professor of Comparative Literature & Cognitive Science,
Indiana University, USA

We did note, in the last session, that there are two preoccupations in this course – one regarding knowledge production within disciplines, the other regarding interdisciplinarity, which has been read as comparison of methodologies between disciplines, methodological insights from one discipline that might impinge on how another is done, or the framing of problems in the space between disciplines, and in a different way from classical disciplinary work. The question of knowledge production per se too has come up in terms of contexts – whose knowledge, but the whose knowledge question has not always been officially tied to the how knowledge question … either a separate question in the domain of ethics etc … so that connection remains to be explored in its fullness, and perhaps today could be an effort in that direction. What we did in this session was introduce another kind of dialogue between two proposals – one for interdisciplinarity as a programmatic activity versus an interruptive one, and one for a robust exploration of the 2-cultures thesis. So we had Prof. Michel Chaouli making, at the outset, a clarification about his position on interdisciplinarity – good if accidentally occurring, but doomed if taken up as protocol. In some senses, he also touched one of the core concerns of this course, which has been seeking to explore the very meanings of interdisciplinarity as well as the current intellectual investments in the word – an exercise the goals of which are not fixed. He also clarified this point by stating that disciplines are not to be distinguished by their objects of study, but rather by their methodologies – the kinds of questions and concepts they cluster around. Sometimes, trying to do things in a programmatic way with multiple disciplines might result in a loss of sharpness of focus. Sometimes the difficulty is exacerbated in the case of disciplines that are closer to one another. Interdisciplinarity, then, might be an emergent phenomenon, not a programmatic one. Prof. Chaouli went on to offer perspectives on how disciplinary work is done in the parts of literary studies where interpretation is the chief enterprise, relating to the question of how interdisciplinary projects are connected to disciplinary projects.

“How do I speak about an experience that is fundamentally mine alone, in a way that it can become yours as well?” was the core question Prof. Chaouli began with. He offered the concept of exemplary normativity in Kant but different in range from Kant to make sense of this question. Kant suggests that beauty is a different mode of standing in relation to the world, than the cognitive and the moral. The kind of pleasure it gives is also different from that available from the body alone, or from the moral. Beauty cannot be derived from rules of reason, and thus fails to carry with it the scientific validity of scientific reason or the moral. It is particular, cannot appeal to a judgement outside. In literary studies, Prof. Chaouli observed, or in the non-natural sciences in general, while we have been insisting on the heterogeneity of our objects of study, we seem to think the subjects are as replaceable as the observers of natural science. From such an assumption is born “the reader”, “the viewer”. This is a giving up on the interpretative core of these fields, that relies on the fact that we are not detached observers. Kant goes on to make a difference between the subjective and the private, to state that while interpretation of beauty might be completely subjective, but not private. “He must not call it beautiful if it pleases only him.” This is a kind of subjectivity that is universal. Experience of the aesthetic is therefore irreducibly subjective i.e. not replaceable like an observation; it is not private or withdrawn; it is not a 3^rd person view, but not entirely a 1^st person account, but responsive to the presence of others – not merely in the sense of influence, but a recognition of their claim in their experience of the text that extends beyond them. In other words, I respond to a normative dimension in them .. this notion of subjective universality means that it is not constrained by particular contexts of the person experiencing them – pure in this sense. Of course this is also not driven by reason or born with us, but learned, cultivated. It is a particular kind of judgement because I do not know if I have fully fulfilled the conditions for its success.

Where, then, do the norms come from? How do they operate? The route leading out of this seeming conundrum for Kant is in the idea of exemplarity. The exemplar is a singular occurrence. It is not an example. In its very singularity, it gives rise to a rule. Not one that gives rise to future rules. It is an example of a universal rule that one cannot produce. Exemplary normativity, then, has the form of norm without its content. This asserts a claim that asks us to be responsive to it. Aesthetic experience is directed not to our reason but to our feeling of pleasure. Kant comes to a notion of the senses communis to mediate the felt claims of normativity as opposed to those articulated through concepts.

This notion of Kant’s, Prof. Chaouli proposed – of exemplary normativity – may also hold for our accounts of aesthetic experience – the kind of work that literary critics do – the work of aesthetic reasoning. It is produced discursively, ultimately, by force of example.

In the 2^nd half of the session, Prof. Chaouli went on to discuss, briefly, the three texts that had been put out – as texts that discuss a relation between the particular and the universal – on both the subject and the object side. Karl Popper’s notion of falsifiability is one such. Popper’s argument on induction, against Hume’s argument, suggests that you have a hypothesis – a conjecture – that you then take to the world; you do not work inductively. Dilthey suggests that both the human and natural sciences come about as achievements of abstraction; they are not just there in the world. The possible differences are in the exploration of the inner life of man in the human sciences, studying externalities in so far as they have a bearing on intentions, meanings. Gadamer’s text suggests that “method” is inadequate to what goes on in the humanities. He offers concepts of “personal formation”, sensus communis, judgement, and taste, as an alternative. These are rich alternate notions of producing agreement or disagreement that are not logically bound to an inductive or deductive reasoning. All four are ways of mediating the particular and the universal without concepts that will wedge the particular into categories given by the universal. Taste is a way of orienting yourself in the world based on exemplars. Gadamer thinks the mode of judgement Kant offers on the aesthetic actually pervades our entire life – moral and cognitive as well.

Session 5:'New' Knowledge and 'New' India: Lessons from the Colonial Past

Prof. Deepak Kumar  
Professor, History of Science and Education,   
ZakirHusain Centre for Educational Studies,School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University

11thSeptember, 2010

Abstract: The onset of the 21st century was treated with a great deal of media hype and forecasts as a century of knowledge and incredible developments. As we move to the close of the first decade of the new century, the hype refuses to die down. Claims about knowledge-society and knowledge-economy (even in the midst of an apparent economic melt-down) continue to pour in as if the earlier societies or economies were not shaped or influenced by knowledge. Perhaps every age is an age of knowledge and change. How did the Indians feel when they entered the twentieth century? How did they look at the then existing techno-scientific knowledge?How different was it going to be from the past?The beginnings saw the apogee of the Empire but things were to change soon.What was their vision of ‘new’ India? How was ‘new’ knowledge perceived? What new strategies were thought of? On the new agenda figured technical education, scientific research, medical intervention, agricultural experiments, institutional dissemination of knowledge. Differences of opinion and controversies dogged the discourse all the time. The lecture will discuss not only the contours of the ‘development discourse’ but also the views that still lay on the margins.


Suggested Readings:


Deepak Kumar. Science and the Raj: A Study of British India. OUP, 2006.


Benjamin Zachariah. Developing India: an intellectual and social history, c. 1930-50. OUP, 2005.



Prof. Kumar began with a spin on the word “New” that his title had contained, talking about the ways in which it had been talked about as modern, western, cosmopolitan, colonial, etc. particularly with respect to science. This might evoke reactions from those who like to think science is universal, but Prof. Kumar maintained that the way science was done was different in different contexts … and such adjectives may be necessary to get at those differences. He also suggested that the whole question of knowledge economies and the globalization of knowledge might well have been a feature of colonial knowledge, and not a new phenomenon. Going back to the 18th century as a time of happenings rather than only decline, we saw, in this session, the advance of knowledge through incremental changes in the country rather than through paradigm shifts. This Prof. Kumar presented with the aid of various examples from the 12th century onwards. He traced one of the important landmarks of the establishment of “new knowledge” as the establishment of the Asiatic Society – here, he says, modernity begins as a change in a way of thinking, an attitude. Numerous other structures promoting rational knowledge came up – the Botanical Gardens, for instance, in various cities. Various colleges, like the Hindu College, followed. 1820-1850 saw 3000 literate people serviced by 30 journals, as an indicator of the vibrancy of debate. The mid-19th century saw the establishment of several new educational institutions with the following limitations – what to teach, how to teach, why to teach, and whom to teach. These questions were of course resolved and with varying results in various ways by the colonial regime, as seen in various commission reports post-Independence too. The 19th century saw an attempt, which was also a struggle, to ‘synthesize’ traditional and new knowledge – J.C. Bose, Mahendra Lal Sircar, P. C. Ray, institutions like IACS – a cultural response to colonialization that tried to prove that Indians are capable of original research. By the turn of the 20th century, after the failure of the synthesis model, other attempts had emerged – where the development turn may be sited. Prof. Kumar also spoke of the turn to spiritualism, the obsession with reform, the rise of nationalism. Again, new structures were coming up in this time – the Indian National Congress for one. In the event, what Prof. Kumar did is a representation of various categories like revivalism, traditionalists, and so on, to offer a thick description of the contexts within which various responses to the knowledge question were produced, as also the heterogeneity of responses, both of which disallow easy categorizations as well as attribution of pejorative connotations to them. By the 1930s, science has taken a backseat, but we still had stalwarts like Saha, Satyen Bose, all persistent proponents of development. We had, however, also an extraordinary dissenter – Gandhi – who introduced the term “social accountability” to the whole arena of the knowledge politics of the time, as also the question of distribution. The question had its valence, but we still had a westward ho. The questions of development were taken up as state responsibility, and centralization – including centralization of knowledge and excellence – was the inevitable result. The traditional distinctions between pure and applied science also died in this framework. However, the notion that science and technology were two sides of the same coin had 2 results for an undeveloped economy – one, the state got assigned a far greater responsibility, two, the problem of centralization.

The discussion threw up questions such as the value of a study of history of the 20th century such as the one Prof. Kumar presented – an understanding of the contexts for such a history. This might give us a feel for the future if we do it with our hindsight open, as Prof. Kumar eloquently put it. Further discussions again, like earlier sessions, threw open the explanatory tools we had hitherto easily put down – like easy understandings of Orientalism, colonialism – through a different ordering of history than the critical one we have in place.


This session, then, seemed to carry an implicit call for a revision of categories that we might have somewhat easily employed to explain distinctions between 'new' and 'traditional' knowledge, and we might well map the words modern/ western versus oriental/ eastern on to these. From the point where Orientalism was the framework wherein this distinction was even born, we were trying to look at what did not fit even this powerful explanatory framework - at the misfits to the puzzle, if you will - as a return to a recognition of the nominalism of categories, perhaps - that they are not meant to explain the world, and their not doing so qualifies rather than disqualifies them. There are multiple sides to this debate and takers on every side, but we might see Prof. Kumar as actually throwing open the field once again, by saying once more - 'our knowledge', in boldly and rigorously revisiting the attempts at 'synthesis', all of which are words we today cringe from using.

Session 4A:What is Methodological Individualism? 4B:Why methodological Individualism is mistaken

Prof. Rajeev Bhargava
Director, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) 
New Delhi

Abstract: It is part of the orthodoxy in the social sciences that explanations of social phenomena are deficient if they ignore the agent’s own point of view and that only methodological individualism makes the perspective of the agent the linchpin of its programme.  Thus a consensus appears to exist among social scientists that methodological individualism is trivially true. Prof. Bhargava challenges this consensus.  He defends his view by unmasking the crucial ontological assumption of individualists that the intentional ingredient in action is a mental state existing in the individual, and that it can be known without reference to anything outside one’s mind.  He argues that intentions also lie embedded in social practices external to the individual mind, and that without an understanding of such practices even those intentions that lie in the heads of individuals remain unknown.  Thus he rehabilitates a non-individualist strategy that encourages a contextual study of individual actions and an enquiry into social contexts relatively independent of the study of the actions of individuals.

Suggested Readings

1. Rajeev Bhargava, “Individualism in Social Science”, Oxford: OUP, 1992 and Delhi 2008.

2. “Methodological Individualism”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

3. Steven Lukes, “Methodological Individualism Reconsidered," in Alan Ryan, ed. The Philosophy of Social Explanation, Oxford: OUP, 1973.

Prof. Rajeev Bhargava came into the course at the point when we were attempting to pull out of internal dialogues to approach the question of knowledge production within disciplines, with his take on a particular debate that has had both historical currency and its own implications for the agency-structure debate, the individual-social debate, or the intent-design debate. This was the debate around methodological individualism. In Prof. Bhargava’s words, it is part of the orthodoxy in the social sciences that explanations of social phenomena are deficient if they ignore the agent's own point of view and that only methodological individualism makes the perspective of the agent the linchpin of its programme.  Thus a consensus appears to exist among social scientists that methodological individualism is trivially true. Bhargava challenges this consensus. He defends his view by unmasking the crucial ontological assumption of individualists that the intentional ingredient in action is a mental state existing in the individual, and that it can be known without reference to anything outside one's mind.  He argues that intentions also lie embedded in social practices external to the individual mind, and that without an understanding of such practices even those intentions that lie in the heads of individuals remain unknown.  Thus Bhargava rehabilitates a non-individualist strategy that encourages a contextual study of individual actions and an enquiry into social contexts relatively independent of the study of the actions of individuals.

As against collective explanatory concepts, as emerging in Marxism for instance, MI came up with the question of individual agency as against the apparently empty and authoritarian categories of collectivity, saying that standards of good SS must include MI. All human phenomena must be wholly and exhaustively explained in terms of properties of human individuals, goals, intentions, desires, wills, choices … this movement was around the 1950s … upto 1968 when the debate was declared an arid one by Steven Lukes. It was in the mid-80s that analytic Marxists brought it back. Prof. Bhargava ended by speaking of the ability to make meaning, which is what makes connections between the individual and the social; psychological states, or collectivities, therefore, cannot be held responsible for this.

Interesting questions that came up were in the realm of emergent properties, in which scenario the distinction between the individual and the collective seems redundant.

The session and the larger discussion threw up several implications for ways of doing research – that of the individual knower within the context of sociality, and that of the production of knowledge in such contexts, the relationships between social concepts and individual experience, among them.